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"Anthology of the Paradoxist Literary Movement" is a collection of multicultural essays about the Paradoxist Literary Movement in the world, edited by Jean-Michel Levenard, Ion Rotaru, Arnold Skemer....

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I left the totalitarianism and emigrated to the united states for the freedom: Therefore, don't force any literary rules on me! Or, if you do, I'll certainly encroach upon them. I'm not a poet, that's why I write poetry. I'm an anti-poet or non-poet. I thus came to America to re-build the statue of Liberty of the Verse, delivered from the tyranny of the classic and its dogma. I allowed any boldness, anti-literature and its literature flexible forms fixed, or the live face of the death! style of the non-style, poems without verse (because poems don't mean words), dumb poems with loud voice, poems without poems (because the notion of "poem" doesn't match any definition found in dictionaries or encyclopedias)-poems which exist by their absence, after-war literature: pages and pages bombed by filthiness, triteness, and non- poetically, paralinguistic verse (only!): graphics, lyrical portraits, drawings, drafts, non-words and non-sentence poems very upset free verse and trivial hermetic verse intelligible unintelligible language, unsolved and open problems of mathematics like very nice poems of the spirit-we must scientificize the art ...

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Andromache dramatizes Andromache's life as a slave, years after the events of the Trojan War, and her conflict with her master's new wife, Hermione.

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Drawing on the histories of three services—Great Britain’s Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965—Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoiding this potential trap. ...

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INTRODUCTION . . .1 THE NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE FOR AIRPOWER . . .5 AIRPOWER AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSIVE . . .18 ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918–38 . . .31 ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967–73 . . .52 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1953–65 . . .65 IMPLICATIONS . . .88 NOTES . . .95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .107...

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Set in the city of Argos a few years after the Trojan war, it is based around the character of Electra, and the vengeance that she and her brother Orestes take on their mother Clytemnestra and step father Aegisthus for the murder of their father, Agamemnon....

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Hēkabē is a tragedy by Euripides written c. 424 BC. It takes place after the Trojan War, but before the Greeks have departed Troy. The central figure is Hēkabē, wife of King Priam, formerly Queen of the now-fallen city. It depicts Hēkabē's grief over the death of her daughter Polyxena, and the revenge she takes for the murder of her youngest son Polydorus....

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Ovid's help for lovers trying to escape from love.

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Part I: Words with Cupid, and The Task Part II: Treat it Early: Fill Your Time with War or Law Part III: You Can Also Farm, Hunt, or Travel Part IV: But Forget Witchcraft! Part V: Contemplate her Defects Part VI: Now About Sex Part VII: Have More Than One Lover Part VIII: Be Cool With Her Part IX: Or Sate Yourself With Her Part X: Forget Her, and Don’t Be Alone Part XI: Now, Keep Away From Her Part XII: Don’t Weaken Part XIII: Get Rid of all Reminders Part XIV: Avoid the Arts Part XV: Love your Rival Part XVI: The Doctor’s Last Advice...

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The famous final part of the anti-war trilogy from the master of Athenian 'Old Attic' Comedy, with stage directions, and an introduction for theatre directors....

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It chronicles the fate of the warrior Ajax after the events of the Iliad, but before the end of the Trojan War.

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The aftermath of the War of the Seven Against Thebes.

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A prelude to the Trojan War.

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A further instalment of his satirical trilogy opposing the Peloponnesian War.

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His comic masterpiece written beneath the shadow of defeat during the Peloponnesian War.

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My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept began in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help campaign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled in such controversy and confusion. I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surrounds the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by drawing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the difficulties of communication and shift the focus of our arguments in a direction that will be more profitable to all....

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Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

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Unfortunately, the existence of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structures, mechanisms, systems, and capabilities does not guarantee success. Major Orr attacks the basic problem of producing a conceptual model of the combat operations process. Only after he establishes the context, a paradigm of warfare based on classical literature, does he discuss the appropriate C3I architecture that will yield the desired results. In a larger sense, Major Orr’s study is an attempt to redefine the nature of modern technology-intensive warfare. This is a broad and contentious problem. While the reader may not agree with all of Major Orr’s assumptions and conclusions, this larger effort is vital to the American military’s capability to cope successfully with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world. In this larger sense, the importance of Major Orr’s study goes far beyond the particular problems of C3I....

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I COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sun Tzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Objectives of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civil-Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 2 Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Carl von Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Andre Beaufre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The American Style of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Traditional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II C3I AND THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 The Combat Operations Process Model . . . .34 Expansion of the Process Model Functions . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III COMMAND OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Purpose of Command . . . ....

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A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

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PART I Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture 1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stephen E. Wright 2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Frank Gallegos 3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures . . . . . . . . . . 103 Christian C. Daehnick PART II Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives 4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 David W. Ziegler PART III Space Control Perspectives 5 Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 James G. Lee 6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . . . . . . . 303 Cynthia A. S. McKinley PART IV High-Ground Perspectives 7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 William W. Bruner III 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Michael A. Rampino 9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction...

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The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in the ongoing global war on terrorism.The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and strategically. This paper provides background information on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies; their applications within the special operations forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal chemical technologies are new, their path to development has been navigated with forethought and discretion....

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PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

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This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Methodology and Analytical Criteria . . . . 2 Definition of Terms . . . . 4 Summary . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS . . . . . 7 Weinberger’s Principles . . . . . 7 Current Guidance . . . . 11 Planning for Conflict Termination . . . . 13 Summary . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . 17 3 SOMALIA CASE STUDY . . . . 21 Political Considerations . . . . . 22 United Nations Mandates . . . . 23 Exit Strategy . . . . . 25 Success or Failure? . . . . 26 Weinberger’s Principles Revisited . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29 4 HAITI CASE STUDY . . . . 31 Political Considerations . . . . . 32 United Nations Mandates . . . . 34 Exit Strategy . . . . . 35 Success or Failure? . . . . 37 Guidance Revisited . . . . 39 Summary . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . 46...